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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTINE BAKER, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Gary Baker, 
for herself and the other heirs of GARY 
BAKER, 
Plaintiff- Appellee, 
vs. 
GREGORY P. STEVENS, M.D., 
RICHARD M. ROSENTHAL, M.D. and 
IHC HEALTH CENTER - HOLLADAY, 
Defendants - Appellants. 
CaseNo.20030434-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE CHRISTINE BAKER 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-191 grants the right to an immediate appeal from an order 
denying a motion to compel arbitration. Jurisdiction over the appeal is proper in this Court 
pursuant to Utah Const, art. II, § 3 and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Does an arbitration agreement between a physician and a patient preclude the 
patient's statutory heirs from access to the courts to bring a wrongful death action, where the 
wrongful death action did not arise from the contractual relationship between the physician 
and the patient? 
2. Is an arbitration agreement enforceable where no evidence was presented that 
it was verbally explained to the patient as required by statute? 
Repealed effective May 15,2003, the day after the notice of appeal was filed. 2002 Utah 
Laws, ch. 326, § 33. The current statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-129 (as enacted by 2002 
Utah Laws, ch. 326, § 29), provides the same right of appeal. 
The decision of the trial court to deny a motion to compel arbitration presents a 
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Sosa v. Poulos, 924 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 
1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-17 (as enacted by 1999 Utah Laws, Ch. 278, § 1) is included 
in the addendum to the briefs of Dr. Rosenthal and the Utah Medical Association. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from an order denying arbitration in a 
civil case. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Plaintiff filed this action on 
behalf of herself and the other heirs of Gary Baker, seeking damages for his wrongful death 
resulting from the medical malpractice of the defendants. ®. 6-1.) Defendants did not 
answer, but each filed a Motion to Stay and Compel Arbitration. ®. 9-7,22-20.) Following 
briefing and oral argument, the court denied the motion from the bench. An Order Denying 
Motion to Compel Arbitration was entered May 14,2003. ®. 85-83.) Defendants thereafter 
filed a Joint Notice of Appeal on November 14, 2004. ®. 88-86.) 
C. Statement of Facts. Gary Baker died April 11,2001. The cause of death was 
stated as coronary artery atherosclerosis. ®. 4.) At the time of his death, he was under the 
care of Dr. Stevens, who had been his primary care physician for approximately eight years. 
He last visited with Dr. Stevens on April 10,2001, a day before his death. He had consulted 
with Dr. Rosenthal on April 3, 2001, just a week before his death. ®. 4.) 
Mr. Baker was only 53 years old at the time of his death but exhibited several 
indicators that he was at high risk for developing heart disease, including that he was 
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overweight, had a history of heart disease in his immediate family, and suffered from anxiety, 
depression and stress. ®. 4.) 
Mr. Baker also suffered from migraine headaches. Dr. Stevens gave him a 
prescription for Zomig and later renewed that prescription, even though Mr. Baker 
complained to Dr. Stevens that when he took the medication it would give him a warm 
sensation in his chest. Mr. Baker also consulted with Mr. Rosenthal for assistance with pain 
management for his migraine headaches. On April 10, 2001, Mr. Baker was again seen by 
Dr. Stevens, and Dr. Stevens gave Mr. Baker samples and a prescription for Maxalt for his 
migraines. He died the following day. ®. 4.) 
Through his long relationship with Dr. Stevens, Mr. Baker never signed an arbitration 
agreement. On his one visit with Dr. Rosenthal, however, he did sign an arbitration 
agreement. A copy of the agreement is attached to each appellant's brief. No evidence was 
presented to the trial court that the detailed verbal explanation required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-17(l)(a) was given to Mr. Baker before he signed the agreement. 
By agreement of the parties, discovery is continuing in the trial court during the 
pendency of this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The right to access to the courts for redress of grievances is a valuable right 
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. Although parties may agree to forgo that right in order 
to participate in arbitration, neither Mrs. Baker nor any heir waived that constitutional right. 
The fact that Mr. Baker signed an arbitration agreement with one physician does not operate 
to deny Mrs. Baker and the other statutory heirs access to the courts. Their cause of action 
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for wrongful death does not arise from the contractual relationship between Mr. Baker and 
his physicians, and they are not bound by his contract. 
The Court need not, however, decide these constitutional and contract issues. The 
arbitration agreement is unenforceable because it does not comply with the statutory 
requirements for medical arbitration agreements. Arbitration agreements with a medical 
provider are valid only if a detailed verbal explanation is given prior to signature. 
Defendants had the burden of proving entitlement to arbitration and failed to present any 
evidence that such a detailed verbal explanation was given. 
ARGUMENT 
I: THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT DOES NOT 
COMPLY WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS 
AND IS UNENFORCEABLE. 
The proceedings before the trial court focused on whether the plaintiffs right of 
access to the courts could be denied by an arbitration agreement signed by her deceased 
husband. The court did not need to resolve that issue, however, because the arbitration 
agreement does not comply with the mandatory provisions of the Utah statute relating to 
arbitration agreements between a patient and health care provider. The agreement could not 
have been enforced against Mr. Baker. It follows that it could not have been enforced 
against Mrs. Baker. Even though this argument was not relied upon below, it is well 
established that a trial court decision may be affirmed "on any ground available to the trial 
court, even if it was not relied upon below." Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, ^ J 7,52 P.3d 1190, 
1192. 
Defendants had the burden to establish the existence of a binding arbitration 
agreement. Mohamedv. AutoNation USA Corp., 89 S.W. 3d 830, 835 (Ct. App. Tex. 2002). 
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This proof may not be by mere inference, but "direct and specific evidence of an agreement 
between the parties" is required. McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31, 
TJ17, 20 P.3d 901, 905. Defendants failed to meet their burden of proving the existence of 
a valid arbitration agreement. 
The requirements for a valid arbitration agreement between a patient and a health care 
provider are set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (as enacted by 1999 Utah Laws, Ch. 
278, § 1). The statute provides that an arbitration agreement is not enforceable unless the 
patient is given, "in writing and by verbal explanation," six specified items of information.2 
No verbal explanation was given. Defendants, whose burden it was to present 
evidence establishing the existence of a valid agreement, presented no evidence other than 
the written agreement itself. This Court should, therefore, presume that no evidence exists 
that the required verbal explanation was given. 
It is unlikely that defendants could have presented the necessary evidence. Even if 
Dr. Rosenthal had a practice of providing a detailed verbal explanation to each of his patients 
concerning the arbitration agreement, evidence of such a practice would be insufficient. In 
McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31,20 P.3d 901, this Court held that 
affidavits asserting that an arbitration agreement was sent to all policy holders was not 
sufficient, as a matter of law, to establish that the notice was given to a specific policy holder. 
Likewise, in the instant case only "direct and specific evidence" that the required verbal 
explanation was given to Mr. Baker would have been sufficient proof of compliance with the 
statutory requirements. 2001 UT 31 at \ 17, 20 P.3d at 905. 
2Senate Bill 245, passed by the 2004 Legislature, amended the statute to eliminate the 
requirement of a verbal explanation. 2004 Utah Laws, ch. 83, § 1. This substantive 
amendment takes effect May 3, 2004, and is not applicable to this case. 
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The statute does provide an exception to the requirement of proving that a verbal 
explanation was given as required by statute. Section 78-14-17(3) states that if a patient 
acknowledges in writing that the patient received a verbal explanation, that will be a defense 
to any claim that the verbal explanation was not given.3 That provision does not apply here, 
however, because the arbitration agreement contains no acknowledgment of having received 
a verbal explanation. Article 7 of the agreement, where one might expect to find such a 
provision, contains no mention of any verbal explanation. 
Defendants failed to prove the existence of an enforceable agreement. Defendants 
presented no evidence that the required verbal explanation was given. The agreement, which 
was obviously provided by Dr. Rosenthal's office, did not take advantage of the statutory 
option of stating that a verbal explanation was given. Because defendants failed to prove 
compliance with the statutory requirements, this Court should hold that the agreement is not 
enforceable. The trial court's order denying defendants' motion to compel arbitration should 
be affirmed. 
II: BECAUSE A WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM IS A 
DISTINCT CAUSE OF ACTION, WRONGFUL 
DEATH CLAIMANTS ARE NOT BOUND BY AN 
ARBITRATION CONTRACT MADE BY THE 
DECEDENT. 
A. The public policy favoring arbitration only validates existing contracts 
and does not impose arbitration in the absence of contractual consent 
by the party to be bound. 
The first Utah Supreme Court case to enforce a contract to arbitrate future disputes 
recognized the requirement of consent: "There is a strong public policy in favor of such a 
Subparagraph 3 of the statute does not eliminate the requirement of giving the verbal 
explanation, but simply eliminates the necessity of separate proof. 
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remedy, but it should not be invoked to resolve disputes that the parties have not agreed to 
arbitrate.'1 Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 1981). 
Any doubts as to whether a dispute is arbitrable "should be resolved in favor of the parties' 
freedom to contract." Id. The United States Supreme Court similarly held that the purpose 
of the federal arbitration act "was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by American 
courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." 
E.E.O.C v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289, 122 S.Ct. 754, 761 (2002). Consistent 
with these authorities, the arbitration contract in this case should be enforced, just like any 
other contract, only against the parties to the contract. 
Baker acknowledges the public policy to enforce all contracts, including arbitration 
agreements, but it cannot be used to force arbitration against a party without that party's 
consent. "[W]hile the public policy of promoting speedy and inexpensive resolutions of 
controversies favor arbitration in some cases, these considerations cannot outweigh the 
constitutional right of access to the courts unless one waives that right." Jenkins v. Per rival, 
962 P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). Thus, "policies supporting liberal 
enforcement of arbitration agreements inhere only once the arbitration agreement is 
established." Id. Similarly, in McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31, 
20 P.3d 901, this Court held: 
Judicial promotion of alternative methods of dispute resolution 
is not the sole consideration, however. When parties agree to 
arbitrate, they waive the substantial rights to judicial resolution 
of their disputes. Consequently, the policy of liberally 
construing agreements in favor of arbitration is conditioned 
upon the prior determination that arbitration is a remedy freely 
bargained for by the parties[.] 
2001 UT 31, f 15, 20 P.3d at 904 (citations and quotation marks omitted, italics added). 
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That a party may not be bound by another's arbitration agreement is confirmed by the 
stringent writing requirement contained in the Utah Arbitration Act. Utah Code Ann. §78-
31a-3 (1953) (repealed effective May 15, 2003). Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 800 
(Utah 1998), held that correspondence reflecting a supposed verbal arbitration agreement did 
not satisfy the requirement of a written arbitration agreement. The evident policy behind the 
statute and the decision is that a party may not be bound to arbitration absent the party's 
clearly expressed intent. Enforcing an arbitration agreement against a non-party violates that 
public policy. 
There is no evidence in this case of any arbitration agreement between the "parties" 
to this action. The trial court was correct in holding that an agreement between other persons 
does not bind the parties to this action. 
B. A wrongful death action belongs to the statutory heirs and is distinct 
from any claim owned by the decedent 
Relying primarily on Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997), the 
defendants purport to acknowledge that a claim for wrongful death is an independent action 
accruing to the heirs of the deceased, but then assert that the claim is subject to any 
provisions that would have governed had the decedent brought the action while yet living. 
Defendants' analysis would, of course, eliminate any distinction whatsoever between the two 
claims. Careful analysis reveals that the actions are still distinct. While Jensen held that 
defenses to liability or damages that would have been available against the decedent are also 
available in a wrongful death action,4 the action itself belongs to the statutory heirs and not 
4But see Hailing v. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 112, 263 P. 78 (1927), where this 
Court held that the wife and other heirs of the deceased employee could pursue a claim for 
wrongful death benefits based on an injury to the decedent over a year before he died, even 
though decedent had pursued and lost a claim based on the same injuries. The court held: 
"the fact that Mariner Hailing, during his lifetime was denied compensation because, as 
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to the decedent's estate. It follows that consent to arbitration by the decedent can bind only 
the decedent and not the statutory heirs. These principles are established by several cases. 
The separate nature of the two claims was explained in the early case of Mason v. 
Union Pacific Railway Co., 7 Utah 77, 24 P.2d 796 (1890), decided by the Supreme Court 
of the Territory of Utah. The decedent, while still alive, brought an action against Union 
Pacific claiming he was injured when he was forcefully removed from a railroad car by the 
conductor. (It appears he had failed to purchase a ticket. 24 P. at 796.) He died while the 
action was pending, and his wife sought to continue the action as personal representative of 
his estate. The trial court allowed the estate to be substituted as a party, but then dismissed 
the action on the ground that the tort claim did not survive death. The Supreme Court 
affirmed and explained the distinction between the tort action and a wrongful death action: 
While the wrongful act of the defendant for the injuries of which 
George S. Mason sued, invaded his rights, and the law gave him 
a right of action to redress the consequences of that invasion to 
him, that act did not in a legal sense invade the rights of his 
heirs, and therefore they had no wrong from that act simply, to 
redress by an action. Their legal rights were not invaded until 
death ensued, and then the statute gave them instantly a right of 
action to redress the losses following that invasion of their 
rights. The wife or the children do not succeed to the husband's 
or father's cause of action; that dies with him. But, immediately 
upon his death, a new cause of action arises in their favor. . . . 
The wrongful act constituted a cause of action in favor of 
George S. Mason, while living, but not in favor of his heirs 
under the statute. The right of action at common law in favor of 
the decedent was based on one fact,-the wrongful act; but the 
right under the statute in favor of the heir is based on two,-the 
wrongful act and the death. 
24 P. at 797. 
found by the commission, the injury did not occur, is in no way binding upon the applicants 
in this proceeding." 263 P. at 82. 
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Hull v. Silver, 511 P.2d 103 (Utah 1978), holds that a wrongful death action "is not 
derivative" but is a new claim arising in the statutory heirs. Id. at 104. A husband and wife 
were killed in an airplane crash; the husband was the pilot. The wife's statutory heirs sued 
the husband's estate for wrongful death. This Court held that the defense of interspousal tort 
immunity would have barred an action by the wife during the husband's life, but the 
independent wrongful death action by the statutory heirs was not barred by that defense. Id. 
The independent character of a wrongful death action was again highlighted in Haro 
v. Haro, 887 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), where the Court of Appeals held a decedent's 
estate could not maintain an action for wrongful death. A claim for wrongful death belongs 
exclusively to the heirs, not to the estate. 887 P.2d at 879. In Oxendine v. Overturf, 1999 UT 
4, 973 P.2d 417, citing Haro, this Court confirmed that a wrongful death action belongs to 
the statutory heirs, not to the decedent's estate or the heirs of his estate. 1999 UT 4 at ^ 9. 
Consistent with these authorities, Jensen reaffirmed "an action for wrongful death is 
an independent action accruing in the heirs of the deceased" and "that the wrongful death 
cause of action is based on the underlying wrong done to the decedent and may only proceed 
subject to at least some of the defenses that would have been available against the decedent 
had she lived to maintain her own action." 944 P.2d at 332. Jensen did not hold, and could 
not have held without overruling the extensive body of Utah cases on the subject, that a 
wrongful death action is subject to all defenses available to and contracts made by the 
deceased. 
These Utah cases may be summarized as follows: The wrongful death claim consists 
of the wrongful act and the death. Wrongful death claims are subject to comparative 
negligence and other tort defenses that measure the "wrongfulness" of the act. Claims that 
have been barred by a statute of limitation are not revived by the death of the victim. 
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Defenses personal to the decedent, such as interspousal tort immunity, do not apply to the 
statutory heirs because their action is independent and not derivative. 
Because the wrongful death action is an independent action, the decedent's personal 
contract regarding the forum in which the action may be pursued cannot bind the statutory 
heirs. An arbitration agreement is a personal contract, not a tort defense. The wrongful 
death claim itself belongs exclusively to the heirs. Determining how the claim is pursued is 
exclusively the prerogative of the statutory heirs. 
C. Utah statutes do not mandate arbitration against nonsignatories. 
Dr. Stevens and IHC argue that because the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act applies 
to wrongful death claims as well as to other types of malpractice, and because the Act's 
provisions concerning arbitration agreements allow for one arbitrator for "all persons 
claiming damages," it follows that arbitration agreements may be enforced against persons 
other than the patient. (Brief of Dr. Stevens and IHC at p. 21.) 
The Utah Medical Association similarly argues that failure to enforce the arbitration 
agreement will create the potential for anomalous results when loss of consortium and 
survival claims are asserted. (Brief of UMA at pp. 22-23.) 
Nothing in the statutes mandates imposing arbitration on nonsignatories. The phrase 
"all persons claiming damages" in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17(l)(b) would apply in a 
situation where a person brings a malpractice action while living and is joined in the action 
by a spouse seeking recovery for loss of consortium. Under § 30-2-11, a claim for loss of 
consortium is derivative of the claim of the injured person and is "subject to the same 
defenses, limitations, communities, and provisions applicable to the claims of the injured 
person." The Legislature has provided that claims for loss of consortium are subject to the 
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same "provisions" as the claim of the injured person. Thus, for claims for loss of 
consortium, the claims must be brought in the same proceeding. 
There is no similar statute governing claims for wrongful death. The Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act does apply to wrongful death actions, but the definition alone does not 
mandate that claims from wrongful death are subject to the same "provisions" as would have 
been applicable to any claim brought by the decedent. Rather, the wrongful death statute 
and cases interpreting it provide that a wrongful death claim is a new claim. It is subject to 
the same statutes of limitation, comparative negligence defenses, and other tort defenses that 
would have applied against the decedent, but the claim itself is a new and independent claim. 
The claim here was brought by Mrs. Baker on behalf of all the statutory heirs. Mrs. Baker 
did not enter into any arbitration agreement. No statute burdens her claim with the same 
"provisions" as applied to the claim of the decedent. 
Ill: THE STATUTORY HEIRS ARE NOT BOUND BY 
THE CONTRACT BETWEEN MR. BAKER ANDI 
DEFENDANTS. 
A. Decedent's intent cannot bind nonparties to the contract. 
Defendants argue that the arbitration agreement expresses an intent to bind the heirs 
in a wrongful death action. It is elementary, however, that an intent to bind a $tranger to the 
contract has no effect: 
Generally, the obligation of contracts is limited to the parties 
making them . . . . Parties to a contract cannot thereby impose 
any liability on one who, under its terms, is a stranger to the 
contract.. . . In the case of a written contract, a person who is 
not named in, or bound by, the terms of a written contract cannot 
be rendered liable on it by a mere intention that he or she should 
be bound[.] 
17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 412. 
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Defendants rely on the recent Colorado case of Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375 (Colo. 
2003), which held that "a non-party may fall within the scope of the agreement if the parties 
so intend." Baker respectfully submits that Allen was wrongly decided, was not supported 
by the cases cited in it, and is contrary to Utah law. It should not be followed by this Court. 
To support its statement that "a non-party may fall within the scope of the agreement 
if the parties so intend," Allen cited four prior Colorado cases. Two of the cases, however, 
involved the situation where an intended third-party beneficiary of contract was permitted 
to benefit from the contract. Jefferson County School District No. R-1 v. Shorey, 826 P.2d 
830, 843 (Colo. 1992), held an employee was an intended third-party beneficiary of 
collective bargaining agreement between the association of which she was a member and the 
school district. In Parker v. Center for Creative Leadership, 15 P.3d 297, 298 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2000), the plaintiff alleged he was a third-party beneficiary of a contract between his 
employer and the defendant, and was held bound by an arbitration clause in the same 
contract. The court held "plaintiff may not, while seeking to enforce CCL's duties and 
obligations under the agreement, at the same time argue that the provisions of that contract 
do not apply to him." Cases such as these enforcing an arbitration agreement against a 
signatory provide no support for enforcing arbitration agreements against nonsignatories. 
Thomas v. Redman Manufactured Homes\ Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 1295, 1296-97 (M.D. Ala. 
2003). 
In the remaining two cases cited by Allen, the courts held the arbitration agreements 
could not be enforced against a non-party to the contract. The defendant in Everett v. 
Dickinson & Co., 929 P.2d 10, 12 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996), was a stockbroker, and attempted 
to benefit from an arbitration clause in the contract between the broker's customer and the 
clearinghouse. The court held the broker was not an intended beneficiary of the contract and 
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could not benefit from it. Similarly, in Eychner v. Van Vleet, 870 P.2d 486, 489 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1993), the court held an arbitration clause in the contract between the broker's employer 
and the customer did not require arbitration of the customer's claims against the broker that 
were not related to that particular employer. No support can be found in these cases for 
enforcing an arbitration agreement against a nonsignatory. 
The discussion in section II .A of this brief cites several Utah cases confirming that an 
arbitration agreement cannot be enforced against someone not a party to the agreement. The 
Colorado decision in Allen is contrary to these Utah cases, and it should not be followed by 
this Court 
The Utah Medical Association also relies on Ballard v. Southwest Detroit Hospital, 
327 N.W.2d 370 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982). That case is distinguishable because Michigan, in 
contrast to Utah, does not recognize a wrongful death action as a separate cause of action. 
327 N.W.2d at 371-72. In addition, the Michigan court refused to enforce the arbitration 
agreement in any event because "the circumstances under which such agreements are 
executed render them inherently unconscionable." 327 N.W.2d at 372. The same should be 
said in this case. 
The UMA also cites several cases dealing with investment accounts and similar 
claims. (UMA brief pp. 15-17.) Aa wrongful death action is very different because it is a 
new cause of action, not a continuation of a claim of the decedent. Cases binding an estate 
by the contracts of the deceased are, therefore, not applicable to a wrongful death claim. 
B. Third-party beneficiary concepts mav not be used to impose burdens on 
a non-party. 
Mrs. Baker is not a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement, but even if she 
were, as a nonsignatory to the agreement, she cannot be bound to arbitrate her claims. Third-
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party beneficiaries are persons "recognized as having enforceable rights created in them by 
a contract to which they are not parties and for which they give no consideration." 
Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527, 536 (Utah 1993) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Further, "[f)or a third party to have an enforceable right, the 
contracting parties must have clearly intended to confer a separate and distinct benefit upon 
the third party." Id. (citations omitted). 
Even if the parties to the arbitration agreement intended to bind Mrs. Baker to the 
agreement, no "separate and distinct benefit" has been conferred upon her. Instead of 
providing Mrs. Baker with a benefit, the arbitration agreement purports to bar her from 
asserting her Constitutional right of access to the courts. In the case at hand, Mrs. Baker was 
not intended to benefit from the arbitration agreement. The agreement, instead, was executed 
in order to protect Rosenthal from liability and from damages in a medical malpractice suit. 
Because Mrs. Baker was not the intended recipient of a "separate and distinct benefit," but 
was arguably the intended recipient of a distinct liability, Mrs. Baker is not a third-party 
beneficiary to the arbitration agreement. 
Further, even if Mrs. Baker is a third-party beneficiary to the arbitration agreement, 
she should still not be forced to arbitrate her claims. As was mentioned above, "[f]or a third 
party to have an enforceable right, the contracting parties must have clearly intended to 
confer a separate and distinct benefit upon the third party." Broadwater, 854 P.2d at 536 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). While this statement makes it clear that a 
third-party beneficiary may be able to enforce a right under a contract to which she is not a 
party, it does not hold that such a contract may be enforced against a nonsignatory. In Harper 
v. Delaware Valley Broadcasters, Inc., 743 F.Supp. 1076, 1084 (D. Del. 1990), affd, 932 
F.2d 959 (3d Cir. 1991), the court stated: 
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While the cases cited by Harper hold that a third party 
beneficiary may recover on a contract made for his benefit, none 
address whether a contract may be enforced against a third party 
beneficiary. Harper's briefing and argument utterly fail to 
distinguish between contractually creating rights in or conferring 
benefits on a third person and imposing obligations on a person 
not party to the contract. The court knows of no rule of law nor 
any reason why a third party beneficiary should be liable on a 
contract to which it was not a party. Consequently, even if 
Harper is correct that the Partnership is a third party beneficiary 
of his Contract with DVBI, the Partnership's status as a third 
party beneficiary is insufficient to impose upon it liability under 
the Contract. 
The same rule applies here. Although Rosenthal would like this Court to "determine 
if the arbitration agreement could be enforced in the other direction, i.e., would the heirs be 
able to claim 1hat they are third-party beneficiaries to the agreement and enforce it against 
Dr. Rosenthal" (Brief of Rosenthal p. 13 n. 3), this would inappropriately burden third-party 
beneficiaries in this State. Such a proposition "utterly fail[s] to distinguish between 
contractually creating rights in or conferring benefits on a third person $nd impos[es] 
obligations on a person not party to the contract." Harper, 1A3 F.Supp. at 1084. Because 
Mrs. Baker has not enforced the arbitration agreement to her benefit, she cannot now be 
required to arbitrate her claims under an agreement to which she never gave her assent. The 
order of the district court should be affirmed. 
C. Mrs. Baker cannot be bound to the provisions of the arbitration 
agreement based solely on her status as spouse of a signatory. 
A wrongful death action in Utah may be commenced either by the personal 
representative on behalf of the statutory heirs, or by the statutory heirs themselves. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-11-7. Although the action in this case happened to have been commenced 
by a personal representative who was also the wife of the decedent, the statutory heirs could 
have jointly commenced the case. In commencing a wrongful death action, the personal 
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representative acts as a representative of the statutory heirs, not a representative of the estate. 
Oxendine v. Overturf, 1999 UT 4, fflf 9-10, 973 P.2d 417, 420 (personal representative who 
paid the proceeds of a wrongful death settlement to the heirs of the estate and not the 
statutory heirs could be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty to the omitted statutory heir). 
Because Mrs. Baker brought this action in a representative capacity and not as the widow of 
Mr. Baker, her status as his wife should be irrelevant. Even that status does not, however, 
permit his contract to bind her. 
Mr. Baker cannot be deemed to have had the implied authority of his wife to bind her 
to the arbitration agreement. The mere existence of a marital relationship is not sufficient 
to bestow upon one spouse the implied authority to bind his spouse to an arbitration 
agreement. Maoris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43, \ 22, 24 P.3d 984, 990. 
Specifically, "some fact or circumstance is required in addition to the marital relation and 
management of the wife's property by the husband before an agency of the husband will be 
inferred." Id. No such circumstances exist here. 
Where a wife owned an apartment building but her husband was taking all necessary 
action to have it remodeled, including entering into contracts for electrical work on the 
building, this Court held that "some fact or circumstance is required in addition to the marital 
relation and the management of the wife's property by the husband before an agency of the 
husband will be inferred." Capitol Electric Co. v. Campbell, 117 Utah 454, 459, 217 P.2d 
392, 394 (Utah 1950). In the case at hand, there is no "circumstance" from which Mr. 
Baker's agency can be inferred. Mr. Baker went to receive medical treatment. He did not 
manage his wife's property. He only agreed to pay for medical treatment and to arbitrate any 
claims that he may have as a result of the treatment. Mr. Baker was not acting as his wife's 
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agent, much less the agent of all statutory heirs, and no authority can be implied under the 
circumstances at hand. 
Even though the Utah Code allows spouses to designate the other spouse as "his or 
her attorney in fact," this does not mean that a husband is automatically his wife's agent. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-8 (1953). This becomes apparent when the remainder of the statute 
is read: a spouse "may revoke the appointment [of a spouse as his or her attorney in fact] the 
same as other persons." Id. Further, while an individual can consent to medical treatment 
for his or her spouse, Utah Code Ann. §78-14-5(4)(b) (2001), and while family expenses are 
"chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife," Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-9 (1953), 
these are explicit statutory exceptions to the general rule that authority to contract on behalf 
of one's spouse can not be implied absent additional circumstances indicating that such 
authority exists. See, e.g., Maoris, 2001 UT 43, \ 22. If a husband is automatically the agent 
of his wife, such statutory exceptions would be unnecessary. Because no special 
circumstances exist in the record indicating Mr. Baker's authority to contract for his wife, 
Mrs. Baker cannot be bound to arbitrate her claims. 
Dr. Rosenthal claims that courts in California have enforced arbitration agreements 
against nonsignatory spouses based on the agency relationship. (Brief of Dr. Rosenthal at 
page 14.) Dr. Rosenthal cites Bolanos v. Khalatian, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1586 (1991). Other 
California courts have reached a contrary result. Baker v. Birnbaum, 202 Ca. App. 3d 288 
(1988). Those courts that have determined to bind the nonsignatory spouses have done it not 
on a theory of agency, but based on a concern that it will be inconvenient for physicians to 
obtain signatures of spouses and family members. Gross v. Recabaren, 206 Ca. App. 3d 771, 
781-82 (1988) (cited in Bolanos) {citing Herbert v. Superior Court, 169 Ca. App. 3d 718 
(1985)). Gross held that Herbert better addressed the "practical realities" of the situation 
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than did Baker. 206 Cal. App. 3d at 779. While establishing a rule based on practical 
realities might be appropriate for the legislature, it is not the role of a court. This Court 
should reject the aggressive attempts of the California courts to impose arbitration in areas 
where neither the contract nor the law support denying access to the courts. 
D. None of the recognized exceptions applies in this case to bind the 
statutory heirs to the decedent's contract. 
Even though some exceptions may allow an arbitration clause to be enforced against 
a nonsignatory, none of these exceptions apply here. Many jurisdictions recognize five 
exceptions "under general equitable or contract law, that would allow such enforcement." 
In re Hartigan, 107 S.W.3d 684, 691 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003). These exceptions include: "1) 
incorporation by reference; 2) assumption; 3) agency; 4) veil-piercing/alter ego; and 5) 
estoppel." Merrill Lynch Investment Managers v. Optibase, Ltd., 337 F.3d 125,129 (2d Cir. 
2003) (quoting Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. American Arbitration Ass 'n, 64 F.3d 773,776 (2d Cir. 
1995)).5 Because none of these exceptions applies, the arbitration agreement is not binding 
upon Mrs. Baker. 
First, Mrs. Baker has not entered into any agreement with defendants which 
incorporates the arbitration agreement by reference. "A nonsignatory may compel arbitration 
against a party to an arbitration agreement when that party has entered into a separate 
contractual relationship with the nonsignatory which incorporates the existing arbitration 
clause." Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 777. However, in this case Mrs. Baker has entered into 
5While the Second Circuit recognizes these five exceptions to the rule preventing 
enforcement of arbitration agreements against nonsignatories, "[t]he Tenth Circuit has 
acknowledged at least two exceptions where nonsignatories are permitted to enforce 
arbitration agreements: 1) third-party beneficiaries to the contract containing the arbitration 
agreements, and 2) agents of a signatory to the arbitration agreement." Third Millennium 
Technologies, Inc. v. Bentley Systems, Inc., 2003 WL 22003097, *6 (D. Kan. 2003) (citing 
Gibson v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 181 F.3d 1163, 1170n.3 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
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no agreement with defendants into which the arbitration agreement could have been 
incorporated. Therefore, she cannot be bound to arbitrate her claims under the incorporation 
by reference exception. 
Second, Mrs. Baker has not assumed the duty to arbitrate her claims against 
defendants. Even though a party has not signed an arbitration agreement, it "may be bound 
by an arbitration clause if its subsequent conduct indicates that it is assuming the obligation 
to arbitrate." Id. (citing Gvozdenovic v. United Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d 1100,1105 (2d Cir. 
1991)). Where employees sent a representative to arbitrate claims with an employer, the 
court held that the employees' "conduct manifested a clear intent to arbitrate the dispute." 
Gvozdenovic, 933 F.2d at 1105. In the case at hand, Mrs. Baker has not assumed, through 
her conduct, the duty to arbitrate her claims. Instead, Mrs. Baker's conduct shows her intent 
to have her claims resolved not by arbitration but in a court of law. The assumption 
exception cannot be applied to force Mrs. Baker to arbitrate her claims. 
Third, the agency exception is inapplicable to this case. The Restatement defines 
"agency" as "the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one 
person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent 
by the other to so act." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1(1) (1958); see also Mecham v. 
Consolidated Oil & Transp., Inc., 2002 UT App 251, \ 13, 53 P.3d 479, 483 (adopting the 
Restatements definition of "agency"); Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (same). Mr. Baker was not acting as an agent on behalf of the statutory heirs 
when he signed the arbitration agreement, and they cannot be bound thereby. 
In order to show that Mr. Baker signed the arbitration agreement as agent for the 
statutory heirs, defendants "must prove that (1) [they] manifested that [Mr. Baker] could act 
for [them], (2) [the statutory heirs] accepted the proposed undertaking, and (3) both [Mr. 
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Baker and the heirs] understood that [the heirs were] to be in charge of the undertaking." 
Wardley Corp., 962 P.2d at 89 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency §1(1) cmt. b (195 8)); 
see also Mecham, 2002 UT App 251, ^ 13. These requirements have not been met. 
"Moreover, and critical in this case, an agency relationship can arise only at the will 
and by the act of the principal." Wardley Corp., 962 P.2d at 89 (citation and brackets 
omitted). The statutory heirs did nothing to vest Mr. Baker with authority to sign an 
arbitration agreement on their behalf. Therefore, the agency exception is not applicable to 
this case. 
Fourth, the veil-piercing/alter ego exception is inapplicable because the Bakers were 
not corporations. 
Finally, Mrs. Baker should not be forced to arbitrate her claims under the estoppel 
exception. A nonsignatory to an agreement cannot accept some benefits of the agreement 
and then refuse to be bound by an arbitration clause within the same agreement. See 
Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. American Arbitration Ass % 64 F.3d 773,778-79 (2d Cir. 1995). The 
statutory heirs have not received nor sought any benefits under the arbitration agreement; 
therefore, they are not bound by it. 
Further, one court that allowed nonsignatories "to enforce an arbitration agreement 
against a signatory when the signatory's claims are sufficiently 'intertwined with' and 
'related to' the contract containing the arbitration agreement" refused to enforce arbitration 
against a non-signatory because "the underlying basis for this rule—equitable estoppel—is 
not present when the situation is reversed." Thomas v. Redman Manufactured Homes, Inc., 
244 F.Supp.2d 1295,1296-97 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (citations omitted). The court reasoned that 
"when a non-signatory attempts to enforce an arbitration agreement against a signatory, 
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courts have estopped the signatory from denying the existence of the arbitration provision 
. . . ." Id. at 1296. However, "[i]n the reverse situation—when the signatory attempts to 
enforce an arbitration clause against a non-signatory—the non-signatory has never agreed 
to arbitrate anything, thus it cannot be estopped from avoiding an arbitration clause that 
simply does not exist." Id. at 1296-97 (citations omitted). The estoppel exception cannot be 
applied to the case at hand. 
Dr. Stevens cites to County of Contra Costa v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan Inc., 
47 Cal. App. 41h 237 (1996), as illustrating other situations where arbitration agreements have 
enforced against nonsignatories. (Brief of Dr. Stevens pp 17-18.) Each of the situations 
described in that case, however, involved a situation where the nonsignatory spouse received 
benefits, such as health insurance benefits, or had another relationship that justified binding 
the spouse to the to the arbitration agreement. None of those situations exist here. 
Because there are no factors creating an exception to the general rule applying 
arbitration agreements only against signatories to the agreements, the order denying 
defendants' motion must be affirmed. 
IV: THE CONSTITUTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 
FAVOR ALLOWING PLAINTIFF A RIGHT OF 
ACCESS TO THE COURTS. 
Although public policy may favor arbitration of disputes, the right of individuals to 
vindicate their rights in a court of law is a greater, constitutional right. Specifically, this 
Court has held that "while the public policy of promoting speedy and inexpensive resolutions 
of controversies favor arbitration in some cases, . . . these considerations cannot outweigh 
the constitutional right of access to the courts unless one waives that right." Jenkins v. 
Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 800 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). The importance of this right 
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is demonstrated by the stringent writing requirement contained in the Utah Arbitration Act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-3 (1953) (repealed effective May 15, 2003). Where a company 
sought to enforce an arbitration agreement that was memorialized in correspondence between 
the parties, the court held that "policies supporting liberal enforcement of arbitration 
agreements inhere only once the arbitration agreement is established," and that the 
unacknowledged letters indicated only a unilateral intent to arbitrate. Jenkins, 962 P.2d at 
800. 
The Utah Constitution protects the right of individuals to have their claims evaluated 
in a court of law. Utah Const, art. I, § 11. The Utah Constitution further guarantees the 
"right of action" for wrongful death. Utah Const, art. XVI, § 5. The founders of this nation 
looked upon the right of a jury trial with such importance that "[t]he extensive use of vice-
admiralty courts by colonial administrators to eliminate the colonists' right of jury trial was 
listed among the specific offensive English acts denounced in the Declaration of 
Independence." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,340,99 S.Ct. 645,656 (1979) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This Court has also held that "[t]he right of trial by jury should 
be scrupulously safeguarded." Abdulkadir v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 7 Utah 2d 53,318 P.2d 
339, 341 (1957). These constitutional rights should remain inviolate. 
In the case at hand, the statutory heirs did not agree to arbitrate their claims against 
defendants. "Although there is a presumption in favor of arbitration, a party will not be 
required to arbitrate when it has not agreed to do so." Cade v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 956 
P.2d 1073, 1076-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). This principle must be 
especially honored when the "right of action" at issue is guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. 
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The Utah Medical Association argues, at page 7 of its brief, that the policy in favor 
of arbitration was emphasized by the 2003 amendment to the Utah arbitration law which 
authorized a health care provider to refuse care to a patient who does not agree to arbitration. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17 (as enacted by 2003 Utah Laws, ch. 207, § 3). Of course, after 
UMA's brief was written, the legislature repealed the provision relied upon by UMA. 2004 
Utah Laws, ch. 83, § 1. The current version of the statute emphasizes the right of an 
individual to choose whether to participate in arbitration. This Court should accordingly hold 
that public policy does not permit an individual to be bound by an arbitration agreement the 
individual did not sign. 
V: THIS COURT CANNOT ENACT LAWS TO 
FAVOR PHYSICIANS. 
The Utah Medical Association claims in section III of its brief that the trial court's 
ruling will make it inconvenient for a physician to obtain in advance an arbitration agreement 
that will be enforceable against the statutory heirs in situations where the physician's neglect 
kills the patient. UMA claims it would impair the physician-patient relationship by requiring 
disclosure of the treatment to all statutory heirs. UMA asks, "How is a patient to maintain 
privacy in his or her physician consultations when, in essence, an heir's intrusion into the 
relationship is a prerequisite to its formation?" (UMA brief at 20.) 
UMA appears to assume that obtaining a valid arbitration agreement is a necessary 
part of the physician-patient relationship. That is obviously not the case. The 2004 
amendment to Utah Code Ann. §78-14-17 confirms the public policy that physicians should 
not be permitted to require their patients to waive their constitutional right of access to the 
courts. 
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In addition, the public policy judgments implicated by UMA's arguments can only be 
made by the legislature or through a constitutional change. It is not the prerogative of this 
Court to force arbitration against a person who has not signed a written arbitration agreement 
as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-3. A conviction that the law should be different 
"should be addressed to the legislature, who function and prerogative it is to make changes 
or clarifications in the law." Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 334, 337 
(Utah 1980). 
CONCLUSION 
A wrongful death claim is a separate "right of action" guaranteed by the Utah 
Constitution. The trial court correctly held the claim belongs to the statutory heirs and they 
have the right to pursue the claim in the forum they choose. The choice of forum made by 
the decedent is not binding on the statutory heirs, because the claim does not belong to 
decedent or his estate. The decision of the trial court should be affirmed in all respects. 
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